Chinese Chips, How to "Wean Off"?

Regarding chips, technology professionals worldwide are filled with ambition. In fact, companies that have mastered chip design, packaging, and testing have largely established enduring foundations. For instance, Intel once dominated the personal PC era. Although it faced setbacks during the mobile internet era, its solid foundation allowed it ample time to correct mistakes. In the smartphone era, chip manufacturers became even more prominent, stepping from behind the scenes into the public eye and becoming key tools for sales staff to enhance their "prestige." Who says women only care about the appearance and camera of a phone? We also compare the performance of Qualcomm Snapdragon processors. Samsung's semiconductor capabilities are second to none, maintaining a微妙 relationship with Apple. The two companies are fierce competitors in end products, yet亲密无间 in the iPhone supply chain. Samsung provides over half of the components for iPhones, including the critical A-series processors. Moreover, its chip design and manufacturing capabilities ensure Samsung's resilience, which is rare in the world. Even if Galaxy lost to iPhone, Samsung is likely to outlive Apple. In 50 years, the world may no longer need phones, but it will still need processors—high-speed processors embedded in everything.

Additionally, Taiwan's technology sector has made卓越 contributions during the smartphone era, with MediaTek and TSMC being the most典型 representatives. The former lowered the price门槛 for Android phones, while the latter is one of the most important members of the iPhone supply chain. Their most critical survival手段 lies in their semiconductor chip design and manufacturing capabilities, which may also represent the final自尊 of Taiwan's technology sector.

In contrast, Mainland China's chip industry is much more寒碜: In 2015, domestic and foreign manufacturers in China used $145 billion worth of various chips, but the supply rate from China's本土芯片 industry was less than 10%. In some high-value chip areas, reliance on imports was almost total. For years, the total value of China's chip imports has exceeded that of石油. Chips are technologically challenging and offer higher附加利润, with一般利润率 around 40%, whereas the极致 low-end manufacturing we excel at yields only a 2%利润率. Thus, teased by key indicators like import value and利润率, China set a goal in 2015: to increase the自制率 of芯片内需市场 to 70% within 10 years.

Clearly, this goal reflects China's野心, but achieving it is extremely difficult. As mentioned earlier, China's current芯片自制率 is only 10%, and it is relatively low-end. There is a severe shortage of design talent and patents. Moreover, the world ten years from now may not even have computers or phones in their current forms. Influenced by Moore's Law, can we pack increasingly more circuits into smaller areas? Frankly, this goal is not only狂妄 but also不科学.

Great Leap Forward: What Shattered China's "Chip" Dream?

Many things in China have failed due to a "Great Leap Forward" mentality, which translates into modern language as:急功近利. We often blindly set大量不科学的目标 without understanding the fundamental laws governing things. For example, during that特殊 historical period, China launched high-yield experimental field campaigns, determined to achieve a yield of 10,000 jin per mu. Leaders pumped up women with鸡血 and鸡汤, encouraging them to "悍妇能为无米之炊"... These轰轰烈烈的 movements generally stemmed from a统一 goal: to build a proper共产主义 within two years.

Looking back now, this goal was highly不科学. Besides the急功近利 mentality, the most important reason for setting such goals was that the goal-setters did not fully grasp the fundamental laws governing事物运行 and lacked清晰的数理思维. As is well known, Chinese people excel at宫斗 but lack数理思维. The most lamentable aspect of this characteristic is that每个时代都会出现不科学的目标, often consuming大量社会资源.

Returning to the topic of Chinese chips, in the early 21st century, China did achieve some成绩 in the chip field. With state support and funding, Loongson Technology, after spending 10 million yuan, launched "Loongson 1" in August 2002. This was a里程碑 event, marking China's拥有自主知识产权的芯片. The subsequent "Loongson 2" reached巅峰时刻, scoring higher than Intel's Pentium 2 processor on the SpaceCPU2000 test. In such大好形势, China's大跃进式思维 resurfaced, proposing a development strategy to catch up with Intel. Just as we once踌躇满志地追赶过 the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan, as you can see, Chinese chips did not catch up with Intel; instead, the gap widened. Like other大跃进 strategies, China's chip development goals also ignored the most fundamental发展规律. In fact, Intel's achievements in the PC chip field were far from overnight. The semiconductor industry itself has no捷径可走. A tiny chip, from initial sand原料 to the final成品, involves every环节, including design, manufacturing, packaging, testing, and many other steps, all requiring long-term技术沉淀. Moreover, the famous Moore's Law reveals that every 18 months, the number of circuits on a chip of the same size doubles. Essentially, the challenge of the chip industry is突破自己, not targeting a specific company. Additionally, the development of the chip industry ultimately归结于 the entire生态环境. Only when终端 demand is sufficiently strong does the chip industry have the动机 to improve. Another reason Intel dominated the PC field was its得益于微软Windows的统治地位. Periodically, Microsoft would make some不痛不痒的升级, forcing consumers to更新硬件. Of course, you could choose not to upgrade, but the代价 was incompatibility. It was under the相互配合 of these two industry giants that Intel's chips continuously升级ed and催生出强大的应用.

The author speculates that when Chinese chip departments formulated their追赶 strategy, they probably did not anticipate that Intel would also struggle and face无奈 in the smartphone era. It is unclear whether they would then制定追赶高通或者联发科的策略. What is更加尴尬 is that Chinese people often harbor幻想 about these goals—the不惜一切代价也要达成的幻想. At the very least, they must create the appearance of "already achieved." This led to massive government procurement, substantial拨款, and even拟定 protectionist policies to挡外国芯片于门外. These违背商业本质规律的决策注定 once again shattered China's "chip" dream.

Cutting Off the Nipple Painfully, Accumulating Technology to Save China's "Chip"

The development of anything must conform to its own laws. There are no shortcuts in the semiconductor industry. Perhaps we can set Aggressive goals, but they must be made with an understanding of the laws governing事物运行 and our own capabilities. Otherwise, we will only continuously消耗社会资源 under不切实际的目标,换来干瘪的政绩数字. In fact, the success of an industry requires体制,人才, and顺应趋势. Specifically for China's chip industry, instead of setting宏伟不切实际的目标 and spending money如流水 for政绩, it would be better to脚踏实地培养芯片相关产业的人才 and沉淀技术. Spending 50 years or even longer doing practical work would likely yield可观收获.

Generally, the development of a high-tech industry归结于人的发展. Now, everyone knows chips are important—not only concerning money and利益 but also关乎国家信息安全. Of course, relying on imports from abroad also makes leaders面子挂不住. Thus, a轰轰烈烈的 "chip"创业潮 has swept across China.大量资金流向了顾问和演说家, everyone hopes to become a导师. In China, those with利索嘴皮子更容易拿到补贴, after which they大肆宣传,打广告,拍照, and举行激情四射的演讲. However, clearly, these people do not directly创造价值. A more明智做法 is "高薪养技"—allocating funds intended for工业园区建设 directly to技术人才 or introducing some华裔人才 from科技圣地 like Silicon Valley. Avoiding中间环节, leaving资金 for those who truly能创造价值. Moreover, the培养周期 for these people and the研发周期 for products should最好 not be干预ed by policy.更不能拍脑袋直接制定计划. We must find "懂行" people to评估, allowing技术 and专业 to凌驾于政绩之上. Additionally, we must be prepared for长期投资. If a期限 must be added, I think it should be at least 50 years. Only then will China's chips have希望.

Alright, the author admits that it is非常艰难 for a有关部门 to formulate a development strategy that "exceeds their任期." However, for China's chips to survive, achieve自给自足, or even远销国外, some决心 for长期奋斗 is essential. Ten years is too short for the chip industry.不要说自制率达到70%, even producing one or two优秀企业 would already be不错.更何况, Chinese technology never引领潮流. Ten years from now, it might be a新世界.